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    <title>Investing on Fengyu WANG</title>
    <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/tags/investing/</link>
    <description>Recent content in Investing on Fengyu WANG</description>
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    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 12 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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    <item>
      <title>Leverage Can&#39;t Buy Time</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/leverage-cant-buy-time/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 12 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/leverage-cant-buy-time/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Start with an idea that looks airtight: if I could borrow unlimited money and put all of it into Buffett&amp;rsquo;s company, then in theory, given enough time, I could earn unlimited money. Berkshire has compounded at nearly twenty percent annually for decades; once compounding rolls, the interest on my borrowing looks like pocket change. This isn&amp;rsquo;t speculation — this is standing next to history&amp;rsquo;s most successful compounding machine and collecting.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Holding Is Buying</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/hold-is-buy/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/hold-is-buy/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Open any financial terminal and pull up the rating list for Hong Kong large caps, and you will see a spectacle: one company, Tencent, tracked by more than forty investment banks — forty-two of them rating it Buy or Strong Buy, two Hold, one Sell.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Forty-five analysts study the same company. Why can almost none of them bring themselves to say the two words: don&amp;rsquo;t buy?&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Some say Hold is the neutral stance, refusing to pick a side. I find the idea of Hold strange — if you hold, aren&amp;rsquo;t you buying? A stock you bought yesterday now carries a Hold rating, meaning keep holding it; keeping holding it is staying long. The people who truly refuse to take sides sold long ago. So this list contains no neutral party: forty-four longs, and one person too frightened to speak.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Pull the Weeds, Water the Flowers</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/weeds-and-flowers/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 06 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/weeds-and-flowers/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A holding drops twenty percent. What is the first reaction? For most people it is averaging down. Buy the dip, lower the cost basis, recover faster when it bounces. The impulse arrives fast and feels self-evident. But price movement, by itself, has never been a reason to add or trim. The real question is different: what is the money sitting on?&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;One system sorts position moves into three actions, with a single criterion — is the underlying getting better, or getting worse?&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Wait for Confirmation</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/wait-for-confirmation/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/wait-for-confirmation/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Why do people call the direction right and still lose money? Break the loss open and the biggest piece is usually not a wrong call. It is jumping the gun — acting before the turning point has produced a single piece of evidence. Right direction, wrong exit, same loss. The heaviest loss an ordinary investor takes is rarely a wrong judgment; it is an early one.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;A turning point cannot be predicted, but it can be confirmed. One system states this with unusual severity. After buyers and sellers have fought it out, the market walks the path of least resistance: in a one-sided advance, good news gets amplified and bad news gets ignored; in a one-sided decline, the reverse. If direction is decided by the outcome of that fight, then forecasting when the fight ends is a guessing game. So the rule is one line: do not call the turning point in advance — wait for a valid breakout of the range, then follow. New low, cut without conditions; new high, never blindly short. Do not predict the market; verify it.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Verify, Don&#39;t Forecast</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/verify-not-forecast/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/verify-not-forecast/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The same moving-average line: why does one person see risk, another see opportunity, a third see nothing at all? The line hasn&amp;rsquo;t moved. The people have. The difference isn&amp;rsquo;t eyesight; it&amp;rsquo;s craft. Two crafts circulate in markets: forecasting and verification — they look alike and point in opposite directions.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;two-crafts&#34;&gt;Two crafts&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Forecasting works like this: conclusion first, evidence second. Bulls collect good news, bears collect bad news; the verdict arrives before the materials. Verification runs the other way: fix the criteria first, then wait for the market to speak. There is a system that states this rule bluntly: don&amp;rsquo;t predict the market, verify it. Refuse to call tops and bottoms by judgment; wait for clear signals from moving averages, valuations, and fund flows, then act. Calling moves on tips and gut feeling is gambling, not investing.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Waves Follow the Soil</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/universal-wave/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 29 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/universal-wave/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Why does the same wave theory count so neatly in US stocks, yet fail everywhere in A-shares? The first reaction is that the theory is outdated, or that the counting was wrong. Neither. A wave pattern is not universal truth; it grows out of a market&amp;rsquo;s soil. Change the soil, and the waves that grow out of it must change.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;One framework puts this plainly: traditional wave theory fits the US registration-based system — scarce share supply, a seller&amp;rsquo;s market. Under the A-share approval-based system, supply is abundant — a buyer&amp;rsquo;s market — and traditional waves fail there. The difference is not in the charts; it is in the supply structure of chips. A market with scarce supply and a market with abundant supply are two different games: in one, goods are few and money is plenty, and participants bid against each other; in the other, goods are many and money is scarce, and prices are pressed down by supply. Feed the same rule into two structures, and the price action that grows out of it wears two faces. This is not a national trait; it is structural. Waves record the game between chips and money. When the raw material of the game changes, the shape of the record changes with it.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Drops Are the Fuel of Drip Investing</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/ubw-index-drip/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/ubw-index-drip/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Why do retail investors hold the best card at the table, then fold first the moment markets fall? The card is called no leverage, and long capital horizons — the house&amp;rsquo;s money has a deadline; a retail investor&amp;rsquo;s money does not. But a good card is not the same as knowing how to play it. There is a system that turns this card into a set of rules for index drip investing, under a theatrical name borrowed from anime — Unlimited Blade Works. The name doesn&amp;rsquo;t matter. The rules do. Four of them, one at a time.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>One Ledger, Two Pages</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/two-tracks/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 23 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/two-tracks/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Holding one company for years while trading around corporate events in the same market — is that a contradiction? It sounds like one: how can someone committed to a business also chase the money in merger rumors? Push it one level down, though, and it becomes a different question: why must profit come from exactly one source?&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;one-system-two-workflows&#34;&gt;One System, Two Workflows&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;One framework puts it bluntly: investing as the main line, speculation as the auxiliary, the two combined. That is not fence-sitting; it is division of labor. The base position earns the margin of safety — the gap between price and value, realized through time. The event sleeve earns the event itself — the repair of a ratio gone askew, the spread around an announcement window. Two kinds of money arrive by different routes; they demand two workflows. Forcing one workflow onto both jobs is like signing a construction contract with a bookkeeping pen: the pen is fine, the job does not get done.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Two Trades, One Incomplete Education</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/two-masters/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/two-masters/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Learn valuation until it is second nature, and a bear market will still take half the account. Where does the failure sit? Not in the wrong book — in reading only one. Both books sit on the shelf; many finish the first and enter the market anyway. Stock picking and market timing are two separate trades, and a single teacher cannot cover both.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;one-course-finds-the-goods-one-keeps-the-practitioner-alive-on-the-road&#34;&gt;One course finds the goods; one keeps the practitioner alive on the road&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;One framework puts it bluntly: Graham finds the bargains, Livermore tells the moment when picking them up will not end in death on the way down. Graham&amp;rsquo;s course covers selection, valuation, margin of safety, and left-side positioning — the question of which assets are worth buying and at what price the principal is protected. Livermore&amp;rsquo;s course covers market trend, entry timing, position sizing, and right-side confirmation — the question of when to act, when to stay in cash, and when not to fight the tape. One course locates the goods; the other prevents death on the road home. In other words, valuation answers whether it is worth it; the broad market answers whether now will do. Someone who enters the market after the first course is not poorly trained. He is half trained.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>The Strongest Businesses Fall First</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/two-broken-modes/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/two-broken-modes/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Thousands of business models, sorted by what lasts, come in only three kinds. One framework puts it cleanly: the first collects a toll — customers have plenty of options, yet this is the best one, so they pay willingly (that kind gets its own essay; one line of contrast here). The second levies a monopoly tax: customers have no choice, only a price to accept. The third resembles a rhinoceros beetle: burning cash for scale, trading losses for market share. The latter two faces are the market&amp;rsquo;s most celebrated — and the ones whose deaths were written in advance. Why do the strongest businesses have their endings drafted first?&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Five Signals of a Top, Five Signals of a Bottom</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/top-bottom-signals/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/top-bottom-signals/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Every time a market reaches an extreme, someone starts guessing price targets. Guessing a target means predicting a number produced by the combined behavior of hundreds of millions of people, armed with nothing but mood and old charts. I don&amp;rsquo;t guess targets. I count signals. There are five for a top and five for a bottom, all observable behaviors, none of them price prophecies. A position counted from a checklist is far more reliable than a target guessed from a hunch.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Three Sentences or Pass</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/three-sentence-test/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/three-sentence-test/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Why does research produce longer stories the longer it runs? An earnings call runs an hour, the report runs thirty pages, and the business model reads more like a novel with every draft. The longer the story, the more it asks one to believe; every extra layer of belief leaves the judgment hanging somewhere new. The problem is not whether the story is well told; it is that almost nobody asks whether all of it can be cut to three sentences.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Match the Ruler to the Asset</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/three-rulers/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/three-rulers/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Why does one ruler produce two answers? The same company: one person reads the price-to-earnings ratio and says cheap; another reads the same statements and says expensive. The problem is rarely in the eyes; it is in the ruler. Take a chemical company sitting at the top of its cycle — its profit belongs to the past, its capacity to the present, and the cheapness computed from last year&amp;rsquo;s profit measures a move already played out. The ruler is not broken; it was matched to the wrong asset.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Tracks Are Rented, Discipline Is Yours</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/switching-lanes/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 09 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/switching-lanes/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The last time a lane was switched, what was the basis? The leaderboard of gainers, or something else? For most people the moment of switching lanes is exactly when the old lane runs hottest — the rise becomes unbearable to sit through, so the cold position is sold to chase the hot one. That is not rotation; that is moving house, toward the crowded side. In another framework, rotation has exactly one definition: when two triggers fire — a reversal in interest rates, a reversal in industry momentum — switch lanes and redeploy the positions. Two bases only; nothing else counts.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Survive the Cycle First</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/survive-the-cycle/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 07 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/survive-the-cycle/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The cycle harvests in a fixed order: first it lures people in at the top, then scares them out at the bottom, cuts off their supplies along the way, and finally takes everything from those who bet on the wrong horse. So when I talk about crossing cycles, I don&amp;rsquo;t want to start with any indicator. I want to start with something else: why most people can&amp;rsquo;t even hold on to their own judgment inside a cycle.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Valuation&#39;s First Cut Is a Pair of Scissors</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/sum-of-parts/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 05 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/sum-of-parts/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The same company, two PE ratios: one says cheap, one says expensive, each waving a historical percentile. The question is not which number is right; it is that a single PE cannot cover a company. Total market cap divided by total profit — one divisor flattens every difference between segments. The first cut of valuation should not land on a calculator. It should land on scissors: split the company open first, then talk about what it is worth.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>The Door Speculation Keeps Shut</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/speculation-line/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/speculation-line/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Hold a stock for three days, or hold it for ten years. What separates the two — time, or something else?&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The most common answer says: nothing. It is all buying low and selling high; value investing is just speculation with a longer fuse. Same posture, more patience. The framing sounds democratic — if it is one game, then no one can be told the door is shut for them.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Most Lose by Trading, Not by Choosing</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/slow-the-hands/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/slow-the-hands/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Most holders of the very same fund sell it at a loss. The missing money is not on the product&amp;rsquo;s report card — it sits in the trade confirmations. So the question is: should the loss on the account be charged to the wrong product, or to the hand that keeps placing orders?&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The root of most investors&amp;rsquo; losses is not a bad fund; it is frequent buying and selling, chasing rallies and dumping dips. Unpleasant to hear, but it can be taken apart and tested. The hand has a case history, four symptoms.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Slow Is the Fast Attack</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/slow-fast-attack/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/slow-fast-attack/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The busiest hands during the session are the ones that regret the most after the close.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The bell rings, and fingers start dancing across the screen: buy, cancel, buy again. Across the four trading hours, orders outnumber glances at the plan. Count them back after the close — how many came from the plan? The hand isn&amp;rsquo;t slow. The rhythm is broken. A fast attack sounds like a matter of speed, but it wins by landing every step on a mark it set itself — and that mark is drawn after hours.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Cheap Enough To Sleep On</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/sleep-well/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/sleep-well/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;What gets researched before a buy? Most homework goes into returns: the sector, the growth, how far the story runs. The question that matters only gets graded after the purchase—whether the eyes close at night. One system writes this down as a bottom line, under a plain name: the sleep-well principle. It does not test returns; it tests sleep. Returns are an open-book exam of judgment; sleep is closed-book, and examines something else.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>When You Can&#39;t Read It, Don&#39;t Play</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/sit-out-in-cash/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/sit-out-in-cash/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Could the best trade of the year be the one you never made? It sounds like laziness, but it is the most counterintuitive rule in one discipline: learn to sit in cash. Most people reject the idea outright: money that doesn&amp;rsquo;t compound is money lost, and cash is a missed rally. Holding cash in a bull market feels worse than being trapped at a loss.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;So straighten the concept first. Cash is not leaving the market; it is one of the positions a portfolio can hold. A position can be full, half, or zero — and zero is not absence, it is an actively chosen place to stand. One system lists it explicitly in its section on temperament, next to another rule: don&amp;rsquo;t go where the crowds go. Learn to sit in cash. Refuse to copy other people&amp;rsquo;s homework. Keep learning for life. Put those four in a row and the weight is clear: sitting out is not the absence of action — it is an action.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>The Business That Produces at a Loss</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/silicon-cycle/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/silicon-cycle/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;No large industry cycles like semiconductors. Every three to four years: shortage, expansion, glut, repeat. And the most counterintuitive scene plays out again and again — prices fall below cost, the whole industry is losing money, and yet the fabs keep running flat out. That is not madness. It&amp;rsquo;s arithmetic.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;shutting-down-is-more-expensive-than-losing-money&#34;&gt;Shutting Down Is More Expensive Than Losing Money&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;A fab is heavy industry in its purest form: tens of billions invested per line, one to two years to ramp up. Once the money is spent, it&amp;rsquo;s sunk — so the loss from shutting a line down exceeds the loss from selling chips below cost. Stopped machines need requalification, trained crews scatter and never come back whole, customers defect for good. When the next upturn arrives, restarting an idled fab costs far more than keeping a loss-making one warm. So the rational move at the trough is exactly the one that looks irrational: produce at a loss, spread the fixed costs, keep the team and the capacity alive, and outlast the marginal competitor.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>A Rally Only Ranks Its Leader</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/sector-leader/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 18 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/sector-leader/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Same sector, same rally. Why do some people earn the index and lose on the stock they hold? The sector index closes up nicely, but the stock in hand hasn&amp;rsquo;t moved. Bad luck? The market’s fault? Neither — the position itself was wrong. One framework states it plainly: the industry cycle determines 70% of a stock&amp;rsquo;s move; fundamentals only account for the increment.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;seventy-percent-belongs-to-the-sector&#34;&gt;Seventy Percent Belongs to the Sector&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Seventy percent is decided by the cycle — not a slogan, arithmetic. When a stock rises, most of the lift comes from the sector: demand expanding, orders piling up, the whole boat rising. Fundamentals, management, product details score only within the remaining thirty percent. The reverse is clearer: when the cycle turns down, even the best company can hardly stand apart. The industry drops a step, the stock follows a step; only the size differs. Invert the order, and the deeper the research, the more confidently it lands on the wrong side.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Russia&#39;s Fortune Hangs on the Oil Price</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/russia-resource-cycle/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 12 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/russia-resource-cycle/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The last post was about South Korea: a country charging into speculation by choice. This one is about Russia, and the direction is exactly reversed. It doesn&amp;rsquo;t charge; it hangs on the wall, and it doesn&amp;rsquo;t decide whether it rises or falls. A country with some of the world&amp;rsquo;s top resource reserves — why has it never truly controlled its own economic cycle? This post answers only that one question.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>A Bull-Bear Cycle Is a Campaign, Not a Decision</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/rotation-campaign/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/rotation-campaign/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Over the same bull market, why does one investor rotate right three times while another never rotates at all — and still ends up on the wrong side? The difference is usually not vision. It is whether there is a route map.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;before-position-a-route-map&#34;&gt;Before Position, a Route Map&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The common argument goes: if you like it, go all in and hold; sector-hopping is a trader&amp;rsquo;s game, and a long-term investor needs no route map. That is half right. Long-term does not mean standing still the whole way. A bull-bear cycle is not one decision — it is a sequence of battles in a fixed order. Which battlefield to fight next, when to switch, what to switch into: all of it has a method. Before position sizing decides what to buy, the prior question is: which stage of the campaign are we in?&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Stopping Out Is the Shareholder&#39;s Core Right</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/right-to-sell/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/right-to-sell/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A position is down thirty percent, and the first question on the table is: when will it come back? That should not be the first question. There is only one first question: does this position still deserve to be held? Most people never ask it; asking it means admitting a loss. So they wait, for a day when no decision is required.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;at-what-moment-does-a-stock-have-value&#34;&gt;At What Moment Does a Stock Have Value&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Start with the most basic question: what makes a stock worth anything?&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Industry First, Then the Business, Then the Numbers</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/research-order/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 28 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/research-order/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Plenty of people study value investing. Yet when they finish and open their watchlist, the stocks at the top are still the ones with the lowest PE. Why does the same body of knowledge keep producing the same result: a ranking by valuation?&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The problem is not whether you studied. The problem is the order.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;the-order-cannot-be-reversed&#34;&gt;The order cannot be reversed&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;There is a system that sets the sequence of stock picking very firmly: industry first, then the business model, and financial statements last. In that order, and never in any other.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Only What Can Be Redeemed Counts as an Asset</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/redeemable-assets/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/redeemable-assets/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The most valuable line on a balance sheet is often the one that least deserves a place in a valuation. Why? The question comes before every calculation. One framework fixes the order: strip out short-term noise and extract the unchanging core assets; only then comes the next step — separating redeemable assets from hollow book assets. The order cannot be reversed: before judging an asset, know what it is for.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Twice a Year, Put the Judgment Back on the Scale</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/quarterly-audit/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/quarterly-audit/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;When was the last time the judgment itself was reopened? Most people remember the price of every purchase, not how much of the original rationale still stands. The windows of annual reports and quarterly reports come around every year, and most people use them to read earnings. They do something else entirely: they serve as the annual inspection of judgment — not of the company, of the original thesis. Do the unchanging assets still stand? Have the valuation coordinates drifted? Twice a year, step back on the scale. That window opens twice a year; missing it costs half a year.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Stocks Are Just Chips to a Quant</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/quant-desymbolization/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/quant-desymbolization/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;An outsider&amp;rsquo;s intuition about quant funds goes like this: the people running them probably don&amp;rsquo;t care which stocks they actually buy — a stock is just a chip that goes in and out, in and out. The intuition is remarkably accurate. The conclusion most people then draw from it is not.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;they-manage-factors-not-stories&#34;&gt;They Manage Factors, Not Stories&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;To a quant manager, a stock has indeed been desymbolized. It no longer stands for a company&amp;rsquo;s products, employees, or prospects; it is a string of prices, volumes, and financial ratios — a pile of chips that statistical models can mine for expected deviation. If a mediocre stock fits the model&amp;rsquo;s logic, the model buys it. If a company with a beautiful story trips a risk factor, the model cuts it. Quants don&amp;rsquo;t manage stocks because they manage factors.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Wealth Isn&#39;t Money — It&#39;s What Lets You Earn It</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/production-creates-wealth/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/production-creates-wealth/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Professional Speculation contains a line that has been quoted for decades: wealth does not consist in making money, but in what enables people to make it. It reads like a rhetorical flourish. It is actually an accounting standard — a test you can apply to any balance sheet, because it draws the boundary between wealth and money as a hard line.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;production-is-rearrangement&#34;&gt;Production Is Rearrangement&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Start with the base of the definition: production is not creation out of nothing. It is the rearrangement and combination of natural resources or man-made elements so that they yield value that satisfies a need. A fisherman converts wild fish into edible food. An automaker assembles steel and copper into a vehicle. A doctor restores a person&amp;rsquo;s health with professional skill. Three acts with utterly different shapes and exactly the same nature: each creates new value that did not exist before. This is also the boundary between humans and every other species. Animals live on what nature hands out; humans rebuild their environment through production, turning scarce necessities into abundance, and even opening fields of demand that never existed before — technology products, cultural services, all of it.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Priced in New York, Traded in Hong Kong</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/priced-in-new-york/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/priced-in-new-york/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A paradox with no easy exit: some of China&amp;rsquo;s best companies — technically strong, reliably profitable — spend years failing to make their holders money. Pinduoduo&amp;rsquo;s algorithms move merchandise without pause, a cold and stable selling machine, yet the stock stays pinned to the floor. The roots of the Chinese listings have moved back to Hong Kong, southbound money buys every day, and still one jolt on Wall Street gaps the market lower at the next open. The companies are Chinese. The pricing is someone else&amp;rsquo;s.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>The Deeper the Fall, the Smaller the Cap</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/position-cap/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/position-cap/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A stop-loss on a single stock is on everyone&amp;rsquo;s lips. A few points below cost, and out comes the litany: discipline, cut, protect the principal. But what about total exposure? When the whole account slides from fully invested all the way down, who has ever set a stop for the account itself? A per-stock stop holds one position; it cannot hold a basket going down together. Everyone inside the account talks about stops — does the account itself have one?&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>What&#39;s Overrated, What&#39;s Underrated</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/over-under-now/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/over-under-now/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Every so often it&amp;rsquo;s worth asking: what&amp;rsquo;s overrated right now, what&amp;rsquo;s underrated, what&amp;rsquo;s been forgotten. But don&amp;rsquo;t judge by price — price is only the outcome. The measuring stick is narrative density: how far the story an asset tells has drifted from the part of it that actually works.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;overrated&#34;&gt;Overrated&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Four things, sharing one trait: far more story than substance.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Pure-concept AI names.&lt;/strong&gt; All story, no execution — no different from .com companies. Twenty-five years ago they died from having no cash flow, not from having no imagination.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>One Company, Three Bosses</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/nvda-three-acts/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/nvda-three-acts/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Nvidia is not one company that rallied three times. It is one company taken over, in turn, by three different cycles. Gaming gave it a meal ticket. Bitcoin paid it a bridge toll. AI gave it the throne. Why would three unrelated cycles take turns choosing the same company? Cut its history into three acts, and the face of each boss comes into focus.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;act-i--gaming-the-meal-ticket&#34;&gt;Act I — Gaming: the meal ticket&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;After the dot-com bubble, Nvidia took a heavy beating. What carried it through was no grand narrative. It was gamers. Gaming cards were the base camp that kept it alive, a perpetual operating cash flow dedicated to servicing the basic debt of taping out chips. Tape-outs burn money; one failure shakes the company to the bone. Only cash flow earned one card at a time, from gamers, could afford the next round of trial and error. Without this base camp, none of the later stories would exist.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>These Do Not Count as Fundamentals</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/not-the-anchor/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/not-the-anchor/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Before opening any valuation model, ask a question: what looks like fundamentals but is not?&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;One framework defines fundamentals as the part of a business that essentially does not change — assets and moats that do not vanish with short-term results or market sentiment, the only reliable reference for intrinsic value. A share price has two parts: haggling plus a random walk, and long-term anchoring. Once that line stands, its opposite stands too: anything that disappears with results or sentiment is not in the anchor. And these impostors are not rare — they sit in the fundamentals chair all the time.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Silence Is What a Bottom Sounds Like</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/narrative-rotation/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/narrative-rotation/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In every macro liquidity cycle, the market has exactly one core narrative. Money drains out of the previously hot assets and floods into the new story — this is not a metaphor, it is a pattern you can replay round by round. In the 2021 Bitcoin bull run, capital rotated out of the traditional internet into crypto. In 2025–2026, AI became the mainline, and capital rotated out of crypto, clean energy, and the other old tracks into AI. Bitcoin hasn&amp;rsquo;t been falsified and it hasn&amp;rsquo;t gone away; its narrative priority has simply fallen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Life Cycle of Money</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/money-life-cycle/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/money-life-cycle/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Why does a generation typically catch only one super-sized bull market? After every major top, the after-the-fact explanations number in the thousands: liquidity, policy, sentiment, external shocks. Each one is self-consistent; each one is a rearview-mirror story. Stretch the time scale to a whole generation, and none of them holds up. The real cause may not lie in sentiment at all. It lies in the route money takes — because a country&amp;rsquo;s money issuance and withdrawal follow the human life cycle.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Clear the Mines Before You Talk Value</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/minefield-list/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 17 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/minefield-list/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;When an account loses big, what is the most common cause? Failing to find a great company — or stepping on a mine that could have been avoided? Go through the worst-hit accounts and the cause of death is rarely &amp;ldquo;missed the winner.&amp;rdquo; Mostly, they stepped on something. The first step in stock picking is not finding good companies. It is ruling out the ones that die for certain.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;mines-first-value-later&#34;&gt;Mines First, Value Later&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Almost every stock-picking guide teaches how to find good companies. But mines come first in the logic: if the mines are not cleared, even the right company cannot be held — the account hits zero, and every later opportunity belongs to someone else.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Method That Publishes Its Own Price List</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/method-price/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/method-price/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;There is no such thing as a free investing method — only bills that were never written down. A method that survives hangs its price list on the door: long waits, enormous workload, no path to sudden wealth, and a position that sits out a rally even after a wrong macro call. Four items, each priced in the open. Most people have seen this method and walk away at the price list. Skipping the bill does not make it disappear; it only trades it for a bill nobody can read.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Four Lanes, Four Scripts in Pharma</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/med-four-lanes/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/med-four-lanes/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The same sector — why does it make money for some and lose money for others? Everyone bought pharma, cheering when it rose, cursing the policy when it fell; yet a few years on, the account curves had diverged. The problem is rarely luck. Underneath the word pharma there is not one track but four businesses — blood products, traditional Chinese medicine, innovative drugs, generics — each eating from its own bowl, each playing its own script. Reading four scripts as one is the first source of losses.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Investing Is the Means, Living Is the End</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/means-to-an-end/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/means-to-an-end/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The number in the account keeps rising. At some figure, does one stop? Rarely. Numbers carry a flaw: once they land, they instantly become the starting point of the next target. At a million one thinks of three; at three, of ten; the finish line moves forward with the balance. Most people have no such figure in their ledger, because the question was wrong from the start: the number itself is not the endpoint — what the number finally gets exchanged for is.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>The Market Has Worn Four Faces</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/market-four-stages/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/market-four-stages/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;From the era when coal reigned to the era when traffic reigned, what happened in between? Over forty years, the market economy has worn four faces. Each change of face moves the main track of wealth wholesale; those who miss it keep hunting for growth on the old track.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;four-faces&#34;&gt;Four Faces&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;There is a framework that turns this history into a model: the four stages of the market economy.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Stage 1.0: material scarcity, when the means of production reigned. In those years, whoever held capacity was the protagonist — early coal and nonferrous metals stood exactly there. The phrase is literal: goods sold themselves, and whoever held the mines and factories held the say.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Mr. Market Is Manic-Depressive</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/manic-mister/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 05 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/manic-mister/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The same company, with no fundamental change, can double in market value within a year and then fall back to where it started. Over that year, what changed about the company? The same factories, the same orders, not one number moved. What moved was whoever quoted the price.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;In the textbook the market is efficient: prices reflect all known information, valuation is precise, and nobody can take advantage of anybody. Clean, elegant — missing only one thing: it exists only in textbooks. The Mr. Market of reality is a manic-depressive, violently unstable. In his manic phase, everything deserves a sky-high price and a story can pass for ten years of profits; in his depressive phase, even gifts feel too hot to hold and good assets get cut in half all the same. His quotes are often laughably absurd. New-energy vehicles, liquor — an industry&amp;rsquo;s fundamentals do not transform overnight, yet share prices can surge and crash. What moves is never the industry; it is the mood of Mr. Market himself, swinging. The textbook calls this swing noise and assumes it averages out in time; Mr. Market&amp;rsquo;s moods never average out — they only alternate.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>The Order Is the Knowledge</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/learning-path/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/learning-path/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Two people can read with equal fluency and equal appetite, and end up with a gulf between their investing judgments. Where does that gap open? Not in intelligence, not in access to information — in sequence. One system puts it bluntly: learning to invest is not collecting facts, it is installing an operating system in dependency order. Foundation first, modules after. In the wrong order, the more you install, the more you break.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Koreans Aren&#39;t Born Gamblers.</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/korea-compressed-modernity/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/korea-compressed-modernity/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;What was this country doing during the bitcoin bull market? Office workers watching candlestick charts on the job, college students taking out loans to trade futures, retirees throwing their pensions into crypto markets. Forty percent of global bitcoin trading volume came from a nation of fifty million people. No formula makes that share come out even. The question isn&amp;rsquo;t that they traded hard. The question is: why here, of all places?&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Winners Study the Crowd, Losers Study the Stock</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/know-your-opponent/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/know-your-opponent/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ten years at the same charts: why does one person get sharper while another just gambles harder? The difference is not effort. It is the object of study. Losers study the cards; winners study the people playing them. Where the money at the table flows — out of whose pocket, into whose — never depends on the cards themselves. It depends on what the person sitting across thinks.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;the-object-of-study-decides-the-returns&#34;&gt;The object of study decides the returns&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Most retail investors do their homework on the stock: filings, charts, news, valuation models. The instinct feels natural — learn the company thoroughly and that should be enough; studying how other people think borders on the illegitimate. One framework says the opposite. It sums up retail thinking as staring at charts, headlines and short-term moves, chasing rallies and panic-selling, hunting overnight riches — while mature investors study crowd behavior among shareholders themselves. Winners study the opponent; losers study only the stock. Both kinds of homework are called research, but they point at two different objects, so the long-run results diverge. The person staring at the stock on the screen cannot see the crowd holding that same stock outside it.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Bubble Died, the Rails Remained</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/infra-legacy/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 19 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/infra-legacy/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In 1840s Britain, everyone invested in railways. Valuations went vertical, money poured in, track got laid at a reckless pace, capacity outran demand — and when the bubble burst, 90% of the railway companies went bankrupt. A textbook collapse. Now ask the other question: where did the rails go? Not one mile of laid track disappeared. The bubble died; the track stayed.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;A century later, it was fiber. Around 2000 the world laid fiber like mad; after the crash, 90% of it sat dark, and it took ten full years before it was actually used up. The Nasdaq fell 80%. Lucent and Nortel, infrastructure giants, went straight to bankruptcy. Yet every video you stream today travels through that very cable. The technology didn&amp;rsquo;t die. What died was the money of the people who bought the stocks.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>A Sector Comes in Three Waves</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/industry-three-waves/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/industry-three-waves/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Same industry, same upgrade — why does one investor ride it from start to finish while another misses all three waves? The answer is not vision; it is the map. A sector rally never comes in one wave. It comes in three. Most people who miss all three waves are not lazy. They simply never unfolded the map.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;the-shape-of-three-waves&#34;&gt;The Shape of Three Waves&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;There is a framework that splits a sector rally into three waves: base stations first, equipment next, the device-upgrade cycle last.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>A Good Company Is Not a Good Stock</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/good-company-good-stock/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/good-company-good-stock/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Why does a good company still lose money for its shareholders? It is the first question anyone entering the market runs into, and the one most people answer wrong. The answer is not complicated: two things have been merged into one. A good company is quality; a good stock is quality plus price. Written as an equation: a good stock equals a good company plus an undervalued gap. The company takes up only half of that equation; the most common mistake in the market happens in the other half.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Fundamentals Are the Part That Doesn&#39;t Change</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/fundamentals-unchanged/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/fundamentals-unchanged/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Open any retail investor&amp;rsquo;s stock notes and look at the fundamentals section. What does it say? Last quarter&amp;rsquo;s revenue, last month&amp;rsquo;s profit, next week&amp;rsquo;s earnings guidance. Treating quarterly results as fundamentals is the most common misreading in today&amp;rsquo;s market — and the most expensive one.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;earnings-are-not-fundamentals&#34;&gt;Earnings Are Not Fundamentals&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The popular version goes like this: fundamentals are just the last couple of quarters&amp;rsquo; results; if earnings slip, fundamentals are broken; screen for cheap stocks by PE and PB first. It sounds reasonable, but the direction is backwards. Financial statements are the results of the past; the business model determines the future.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Four Cycles, One Nest</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/four-nested-cycles/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/four-nested-cycles/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Many people treat the economy as a single cycle and try to guess its top and bottom. That mismatch almost guarantees failure — because the economy does not oscillate in one cycle. It stacks four cycles whose time scales differ by an order of magnitude: a 3-to-5-year inventory cycle, a 7-to-11-year equipment cycle, a 15-to-25-year property cycle, and a 45-to-60-year technology cycle. The layer you operate in decides which layer&amp;rsquo;s indicators you should watch.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Direction Is Right; Stay Inside the Lines</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/four-iron-rules/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 03 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/four-iron-rules/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Why does the same stock-picking method turn into a system for one person and into luck for another? The problem is often not the method itself, but what sits on top of it. However accurately you pick a stock, if the direction crosses a line, gains are luck and losses are destiny.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;four-iron-rules&#34;&gt;Four Iron Rules&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;There is a system that puts this bluntly: no operation may violate four top-level rules; this is the master outline of risk control. Nation sets direction, rates set ratio, coordinates set value, discipline sets restraint. The four have an order: nation is the floor, rates set asset allocation, coordinates set valuation, restraint governs conduct. The coordinate principle already has its own essay, so it gets one mention here; this piece covers the other three.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>First in Fundraising, Nowhere in Returns</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/financing-first-hk/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/financing-first-hk/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Hong Kong stocks carry a permanent sense of mismatch: a fairly valued tech company with real cash flow and real growth optionality can sit at a mid-teens price-to-earnings ratio for a decade while its share price goes nowhere. Meanwhile, HKEX&amp;rsquo;s new listings raised 37.4 billion US dollars in 2025, up 231% year on year, reclaiming the top spot among global IPO venues. First in the world at fundraising; nowhere to be found in the return rankings. These two facts happening at once is not a coincidence.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>The Look of Defense, the Bones of a Cycle</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/finance-rate-orbit/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/finance-rate-orbit/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The stocks that look most like defense — why do they fall with the least hesitation? Large in size, stable in dividends, industries whose very names sound steady — and when the market turns cold, they are often still the ones falling fastest. The problem rarely lies in how any one company is run; it lies in the revenue structure. The vital point of a financial institution is not the thickness of its statements but two things outside them: interest rates, and trading volume.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Beyond the Balance Sheet, Vote with Your Feet</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/field-research/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 28 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/field-research/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Two people read the same annual report. One comes away reciting the profit figures; the other comes away having spotted an inflection. Why?&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;the-lag-is-structural&#34;&gt;The Lag Is Structural&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Annual reports arrive once a year, quarterly reports every three months. Before a number lands on the income statement, it has to travel a whole chain in the real world: production, shipping, sale, collection. Every step takes time. By the time the report confirms a boom, the ground may already have cooled; by the time it confirms a decline, the capacity may already have cleared out.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Hunt Fast, Farm Slow</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/farm-not-hunt/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 26 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/farm-not-hunt/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;On the hottest trading days, what is the busiest person in the market chasing? News, limit-ups, the next big theme. Busy, no doubt, and the quarry is in sight. Only when the season ends, most bags hold shell casings, not meat. And the rifle was borrowed; the bullets, bought on credit.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;This trade has more than one honest livelihood. Chasing hot themes is hunting — it earns fast money from volatility: the quarry is running, the shot has to be quick. A hit means a meal; a miss, a hungry day, and back into the woods tomorrow. Rotating between sectors is herding — it earns the market cycle&amp;rsquo;s money: stop chasing the quarry across the hills, keep livestock in the pen. Markets have their spring, summer, autumn, winter; sell the herd when the grass is lush, buy feed when it withers. Holding a base position and compounding is farming — it earns dividends and compound interest: no hope of an overnight harvest, only faith in the land. Harvests vary in size, but every year there is one. The quarry runs fast and crops grow slow, yet the only thing that has ever fed people is the land. Nobody winters on one meal of game, but a field can feed generations.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Defense Is Designed, Not Endured</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/extreme-auto/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/extreme-auto/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;On the day of a crash, how does a human fail to react? Half an hour after the open, the index is plunging, and in the fastest, worst few minutes a person is watching the screen, hesitating, telling himself this time is different. By the time the decision is made, the worst stretch is already over. In extreme markets, what lags is never the judgment. It is the reaction.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;So the judgment has to be written down in advance. There is a self-built automated defense system for extreme markets: the trigger conditions become rules, and once a rule fires, short positions in stock-index futures go on automatically. Nobody needs to be there to press the button. The point of the system is to use automated hedging tools to compensate for the reaction lag of manual trading in extreme conditions, and to hold the line on principal.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Dollar Gate</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/dollar-flow/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/dollar-flow/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Why does a single decision by the Federal Reserve move stock markets ten thousand kilometers away? Why does every dollar rally leave A-shares suddenly tense? Money has no legs, yet it outruns everything. One system explains it as a gate: the dollar is the gate of global capital, and the opening and closing of that gate sets the external water level.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Where does the gate come from? After the collapse of Bretton Woods in the 1970s, the dollar became tied to oil at the deepest layer — the most important commodity on earth is priced and settled in dollars, so any country that wants to buy oil must first obtain dollars. A national currency turned into the admission ticket to global demand. The ticket is not free, and the gate took shape.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Diversifying to Catch the Big Fish</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/diversify-net/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/diversify-net/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Why do academics and fishermen mean two different things when they say the word diversification? The academic version is a math problem: correlations, variance, volatility — the goal is to flatten the curve. One system treats it as fishing: you cast a net not to calm the water, but to catch underpriced big fish. Same net, two uses. Where does the difference lie?&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;two-kinds-of-diversification&#34;&gt;Two Kinds of Diversification&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The academic kind is equal weight: a basket of assets, nobody too big, nobody too small, and the average is the prize. Nothing wrong with that — what&amp;rsquo;s wrong is treating diversification as the goal. If all it exists to do is reduce volatility, then just buy the smoothest assets and skip the effort.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>A Cycle Isn&#39;t One Force. It&#39;s Three.</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/cycle-formula/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 14 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/cycle-formula/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Every bull-and-bear run ends with the same question: what exactly was pushing it? The more unified the answer, the more I doubt it. No single cause explains a cycle, because a complete run is stacked out of three layers: debt decides survival, sentiment decides how crazy it gets, structure decides what gets speculated. Fail to take the three apart and the cycle stays mysticism forever; take them apart, and it&amp;rsquo;s just a formula. Layer by layer.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Credit Is Spending Borrowed From the Future</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/credit-machine/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/credit-machine/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The economy looks complicated, but it is a machine. You don&amp;rsquo;t guess how a machine works; you take it apart. Strip it all the way down and three things remain: transactions, credit, and cycles. Each layer is bigger than the last, and each wraps around the one below.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;transactions-the-smallest-part&#34;&gt;Transactions: The Smallest Part&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The economy is nothing more than the sum of countless transactions. Every time you buy something, you make a transaction: a buyer hands over money or credit, and a seller hands over goods, services, or financial assets. No matter how vast the market, no matter how intimidating the brokers, at the core it is just this — one hand gives money or credit, the other gives something.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Rolling the Cost Basis to Zero</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/cost-to-zero/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 08 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/cost-to-zero/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Take the same stock, held for ten years. Why does one holder grow calmer every year while another grows more anxious? Same posture, different ledger.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;two-ledgers&#34;&gt;Two Ledgers&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Most people keep a single ledger: cost, market value, gains and losses, all mixed together. The stock drops hard, and they cannot tell whether principal or profit took the hit. So they panic.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;There is a system that splits this into two ledgers: one for principal, one for paper gains. Principal is the money you put in at the start — the only thing you cannot afford to lose. Paper gains are what the market handed you later; they never belonged to you, and it can take them back at any time. Panic never comes from the drop itself. It comes from mixing the ledgers — treating borrowed gains as principal, and principal as profit already in hand. Once the accounts are separated, what to defend and what to give up becomes obvious.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Expensive Compared to What?</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/coordinate-principle/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/coordinate-principle/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ask whether a stock is expensive while looking only at its price, and you have asked the wrong question. Cheap or dear is not an absolute number; it is a relative position. A flat seems pricey on its listing alone — until you learn what a similar unit in the same complex actually sold for last month. The judgment never lives in the asking price; it lives in the comparison. Yet in the stock market, most people stare at nothing but the listing.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Bullish, But Not Stubborn</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/convertible-hedge/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 04 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/convertible-hedge/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Suppose the sector call is right, but the volatility is unbearable. Where does the problem sit?&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The usual answer blames temperament. Temperament is the most convenient bin — everything fits. But if the direction was judged correctly and the account died anyway, what needs inspecting is probably not willpower. It is the shape of the bet.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;So take one thing apart: the judgment, and the container. The judgment says &amp;ldquo;this sector goes up over the long run.&amp;rdquo; The container is whatever carries that judgment. Common stock is one container; a convertible bond is another. The same judgment in different containers exposes its holder to two entirely different risks. When the call is right and the account is still gone, judgment and container were usually tied together — betting on the direction and, without noticing, on every bit of the volatility too.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Competing Upward</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/compete-upward/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 28 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/compete-upward/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Same business — why do some stay trapped in price wars while others keep getting bigger?&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The usual answer is effort: not tough enough, not fast enough. But in a price war everyone is tough and fast; most still lose. The problem is not speed. It is the track. The way out is not outrunning everyone on the same track; it is carrying an existing core competence into a much larger market. One framework calls this competing upward: one unchanging capability, ever larger boundaries. A growth ceiling is set not by effort but by dimension.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Position Size Follows Certainty, Not Nerve</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/certainty-ladder/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/certainty-ladder/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Two investors equally bullish on one company can hold positions differing tenfold. Where does the gap come from? Not nerve — different answers to one word: certainty. One system puts it bluntly — the first question of allocation is not what looks promising, but how certain it is. Position size is a function of certainty, not of courage. That sounds like a tautology; in practice it is a ladder, every rung matching a level of certainty.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Buy, Then the Homework Starts</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/buy-then-work/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/buy-then-work/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Before buying, the homework gets done properly: read the filings, check the industry, run the valuation. After buying? The typical move is closing the app and waiting for time to deliver the verdict. Buying gets treated as the finish line, and everything after is idle waiting. But buying is not the finish line; it is the start of the homework. On every day of ownership, the original reasons for buying are tested against reality. The work is not finished. It has just opened.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Buy Divergence, Sell Consensus</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/buy-diversiveness/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/buy-diversiveness/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;How could the signal for a great trade appear precisely where everyone says things are bad? Intuition rejects it: everyone says bad, so the thing must be bad. Yet that is exactly where the market&amp;rsquo;s real mispricing grows. The timing of excess returns hides not in prices but in the distribution of opinion among the crowd: buy when disagreement peaks and pessimism saturates the air; sell when consensus forms and everyone turns bullish. One framework compresses this into four words: buy divergence, sell consensus.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>The Loudest Bears Load Up Fastest</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/bear-shouters/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 14 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/bear-shouters/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In 2018 the A-share market slid all year, and the loudest voice on the Chinese internet was bearish. The persistent bears were treated as the few clear-headed ones, as if they saw something the fully invested could not. Ask one question — what position do these people actually hold — and the image flips. This piece takes no stance on today&amp;rsquo;s market and gives no levels; it handles a single question: what stance to take toward the voices in the market.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>No Core Position, No Wealth</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/base-position/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/base-position/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Many accounts never grow, and the problem is rarely stock-picking. A simple question: the money in an account — which kind of money is it? No answer means a merged position. The core position should ride through bull and bear markets; the tactical position should move fast; cash should enter on the day of the crash. Press three missions onto the same money and the outcome is predictable: the core position gets shaken out, the tactical position gets frozen, and the cash never existed. The root cause is not picking the wrong stocks — it is merging three kinds of money into one.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Baijiu Is a Cyclical Asset Too</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/baijiu-dual-market/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/baijiu-dual-market/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Real estate cycles run for decades, and their imprint is so deep that people mistake a long phase for a permanent condition. Baijiu — Chinese liquor — walked the same road, on a shorter clock. Around 2016 and 2017 it became a market speculation vehicle, with a twist: over the same stretch of time, its price as a consumer good and its price as an asset rose together.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;how-the-two-tracks-ignite-each-other&#34;&gt;How the Two Tracks Ignite Each Other&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Consumer markets and financial markets usually move to their own rhythms, but sometimes they converge. Baijiu is the cleanest case study. More people drank it, so retail prices climbed. Rising prices gave the financial market a story, and money flowed in, bidding up liquor company stocks. Soaring stocks made baijiu look like a collectible asset in its own right, so more people hoarded bottles. Hoarding tightened actual circulating supply, which pushed consumer prices up again. Consumer price rises feed the financial narrative, the narrative feeds hoarding, hoarding feeds consumer prices — a self-reinforcing loop closes. The two markets amplify each other, rising and falling in lockstep, until the trend swells far beyond anything real demand would justify.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Knowing When to Sell Beats Knowing What to Buy.</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/art-of-selling/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 08 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/art-of-selling/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Most people spend all their effort on what to buy: studying industries, comparing financials, triple-checking valuations. But the moment that decides whether you win or lose usually sits at the other end — when to sell. Buying is entry; selling is settlement. Get the settlement wrong, and all the research before it counts for nothing. Selling is not the epilogue of buying. It is a craft of its own.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;learning-half-of-a-lesson&#34;&gt;Learning Half of a Lesson&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;A popular line goes: holding for the long term is value investing, and blue chips make money while you sleep — that is Benjamin Graham. It sounds effortless. It is actually half a lesson. Graham&amp;rsquo;s core was never buy-and-hold forever; it was margin of safety plus a game of expectation gaps. Margin of safety is a cushion for falling prices, not a license to hold forever. Buffett doesn&amp;rsquo;t liquidate at will because his capital is too large to move — that is an institutional constraint. Retail investors have no such constraint, yet they pick up the shackle and wear it as a virtue, copying institutional logic and paying tuition for restrictions that were never theirs.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Even Actuaries Can&#39;t Predict the Future</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/actuary-cant-predict/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 04 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/actuary-cant-predict/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The insurance business conceals an awkward question. Actuarial work is, at its core, pricing the future: how many people will fall ill in thirty years, how many houses will burn, how many ships will sink — compute it all, discount it into today&amp;rsquo;s premium. But pricing the future requires predicting it, and no one can predict the future. So how does a business model built on the unknowable stay standing for centuries? Read through the industry&amp;rsquo;s history of failures and the answer comes into focus: the companies that survive never depended on being right.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Rearview-Mirror Epistemology</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/rearview-mirror/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/rearview-mirror/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In 2021 I bought a star fund and later lost half of it. I am the one who got trapped at minus 50%, and I intend to remember this moment for the rest of my life. What I want to remember isn&amp;rsquo;t the pain. It&amp;rsquo;s a principle: every piece of evidence that made me bet came from a rearview mirror.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;the-rearview-mirror&#34;&gt;The Rearview Mirror&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;It started with a question: doesn&amp;rsquo;t the Sharpe ratio feel like inspecting an asset through a rearview mirror? It measures how much return you got per unit of risk — but every number it uses is historical net-asset value. My fund&amp;rsquo;s Sharpe was around 1.2 in 2019 and 2020, with annual returns of 55% and 95%; by 2024 the same figure was negative. The metric hadn&amp;rsquo;t become false; the road had changed. The flat, straight road in the mirror only ever described what was behind you.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Be Greedy When Others Are Fearful, Written as Code</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/four-filters/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 23 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/four-filters/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Everyone has memorized &amp;ldquo;be greedy when others are fearful.&amp;rdquo; Plenty of memorizers, plenty of losers — because the sentence is missing half of itself: how do you know that today is fear?&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;My method is clumsy: no definition, no trading. And the definition can&amp;rsquo;t be an adjective; it has to be a rule a machine can judge right or wrong too. When the machine rules against it, revise the rule. This strategy was forced into existence by verdicts.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Don&#39;t Ask Where the Money Went, Ask Where the Dog Is</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/dog-where/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/dog-where/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;When Evergrande&amp;rsquo;s 2.44-trillion-yuan debt bomb finally went off, everyone&amp;rsquo;s favorite word was &amp;ldquo;evaporated.&amp;rdquo;&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;I refuse that word. Money does not disappear; it only moves from one person&amp;rsquo;s hands to another&amp;rsquo;s. So whenever money that should exist is gone, a dog must have taken it — that is my Dog-Takes-the-Money Theorem. I know it sounds like a joke, but it cuts to the essence.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;&amp;ldquo;The money is gone&amp;rdquo; is not a description. It is a cover-up — cover for some party that is holding it right now. Evaporation is the dog&amp;rsquo;s camouflage.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>The Money That Actually Lands</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/cash-in-hand/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 15 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/cash-in-hand/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Someone was telling me about his business, saying his profit was as good as earned the moment the contract was signed. I wasn&amp;rsquo;t polite: money that can&amp;rsquo;t be collected isn&amp;rsquo;t money. I&amp;rsquo;m certain of this one, and life proves it everywhere you look. What people say isn&amp;rsquo;t necessarily true; signed-for money is money the customer has merely agreed to let you imagine for a while.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;how-far-an-income-statement-can-stretch&#34;&gt;How Far an Income Statement Can Stretch&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Run the most ordinary kind of deal. You take an 800,000-yuan job, sign, invoice — the income statement books 800,000 in revenue. The client actually pays 500,000; the other 300,000 sits in receivables. Deduct costs and the statement shows a profit of 728,000 — of which 300,000 in receivables never arrived, and 120,000 is unrealized paper gains. In other words, 420,000 of that 728,000 exists only on paper. What actually landed: 308,000. The statement says he earned 728,000; the passbook says 308,000. That doubled gap is the distance between what was said and what was actually had.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>The Crime of Forward-Adjusted Prices</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/adjusted-price/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 11 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/adjusted-price/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The crime scene was in my own database: a stock&amp;rsquo;s historical price was negative. No crash, no delisting — just negative. A price can fall from 100 to 1, but no kind of falling ends below zero — unless the historical price was rewritten by someone.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;the-first-scene&#34;&gt;The First Scene&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The confession comes first: one major bias in my system — the share prices I scraped off the web, are they forward-adjusted? And here&amp;rsquo;s the thing: forward adjustment means knowing every future year&amp;rsquo;s dividends. That ruins everything. Did I scrape all this for nothing?&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>The Tonghuashun Paradox</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/tonghuashun-paradox/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 05 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/tonghuashun-paradox/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Tonghuashun is a trading app built for goal A — making you money. Its target users are non-A: people who lose money. Its effect is also non-A. Even I find it counterintuitive, yet it sits in plain sight: the app&amp;rsquo;s feeds are full of losing traders complaining and cursing.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The data plays along. Thirty-eight million monthly users, forty-plus minutes a day per user — stickier than mobile games. People used to end the night with a game; now they end it scrolling quotes.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Invest in Platforms: The Tollbooth Theory</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/tollbooth-platform/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 03 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/tollbooth-platform/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;What does value investing buy? My answer is one line: platforms. Nothing stays hot forever unless you own the platform. Apple owns the phone platform, Coca-Cola owns the beverage platform, Visa and Mastercard own the payment platform. Nobody really invests in whatever IP happens to be hot this season.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The concrete version: it doesn&amp;rsquo;t matter whether your road is smooth. The road can be full of potholes — as long as the tollbooth is on it and yours is the only road, people still pay the toll.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>The Retail Investor&#39;s Structural Edge</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/retail-edge/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 28 Dec 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/retail-edge/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;An institution&amp;rsquo;s data is a million times mine — put the other way, my data is one millionth of theirs. But my profits are not one millionth of theirs. I&amp;rsquo;m talking about ratios.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Why? Low-frequency value investing competes on signal-to-noise, not data volume. Daily prices, valuations, financials, industry cycles — enough to decide. Everything above that is tick-level noise; the extra millionfold data is useless to me. And none of the institution&amp;rsquo;s baggage applies: no redemption pressure, nobody to answer to when the market falls; no tracking error, so I can hold for a decade if I want; no overhead allocation, because transaction costs are computed on my account alone.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>The Axis Shift in Quant Trading</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/quant-paradigm-shift/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 26 Dec 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/quant-paradigm-shift/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Quant trading is absolutely advanced in technology and backward in structure. What&amp;rsquo;s backward is the objective function: making pure predictions, with no intervention, inside a near-zero-sum system whose signals self-destruct the moment you use them.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Markets are reflexive. Once your prediction is placed as a bet, it starts destroying itself; alpha has a capacity ceiling — Medallion locks its size at ten billion because more would mean eating itself. So no &amp;ldquo;more advanced quant&amp;rdquo; can break through quant trading itself. To break through, you shift the axis.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>I Only Buy Common Stock</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/option-audit/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 20 Dec 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/option-audit/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;I don&amp;rsquo;t buy options. I buy common stock. When someone asks why, I say: shares held in a cash account belong to you — your broker has no right to force-sell them. The words &amp;ldquo;margin call&amp;rdquo; basically don&amp;rsquo;t apply. And look at the people playing leverage and derivatives: why does someone always get liquidated? Because those instruments are gambling in essence.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;My audit for any such product is one question: if I buy a put, or sell a put, is my expected return positive?&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Is Duan Yongping&#39;s Pop Mart Buy a Mistake?</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/labubu-structural-flaw/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 08 Dec 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/labubu-structural-flaw/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Will Duan Yongping&amp;rsquo;s Pop Mart purchase turn out to be his biggest mistake? My view: it won&amp;rsquo;t be a mistake — and Pop Mart&amp;rsquo;s structural flaw is real. These two claims must be kept apart.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The flaw first. Pop Mart is essentially a marketing company. Labubu is genuinely nothing, manufactured into something. Compare Nintendo: decades of seriously made games, IP accumulated over generations, real liquidation value. Labubu&amp;rsquo;s liquidation value approximates fashion itself — when the wind stops, it&amp;rsquo;s gone. In the AI era this sharpens: short on IP? IP is generated by the second now. Scarcity is the foundation of this business — and the foundation is tidal.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Make the Easy Money, Not the Hard Money</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/easy-money/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 26 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/easy-money/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Everyone in business faces the same question: make the hard money or the easy money? Hard money looks like this: display panels. Bayonet fights against foreign incumbents, ending at a 2.7 percent net margin — brutal. Semiconductors are the same: this industry is hopeless; it must always double — layers double, process complexity doubles. I even wondered: could you run a factory that only makes 1TB drives, never upgrading the process? Then it clicked: a fab makes NAND dies; capacity is assembled downstream. And any factory that stands still gets wiped out at the bottom of the next cycle. Hard money is an arms race — you don&amp;rsquo;t even get the right to stop.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Payback Math: I Watch the Dividend</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/dividend-payback/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 20 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/dividend-payback/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Most people measure payback by price: when the stock climbs back to your cost, you&amp;rsquo;re &amp;ldquo;saved.&amp;rdquo; My yardstick is different. You watch the price; I watch the dividend — I get my money back through dividends.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Run the numbers. A company with a 6.5 percent dividend yield and a P/E of 15, price flat for years: by price, it&amp;rsquo;s a dead stock; by dividend, you break even in fifteen years and collect 6.5 percent a year forever after. The extreme case: a company whose market cap once fell below the cash on its books — the computed share price was negative. Buying it meant getting the company for free; the dividends were a bonus.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Don&#39;t Trust the Data, Trust the Business</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/data-lies/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 16 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/data-lies/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Data can&amp;rsquo;t be trusted. Stare at the numbers and things will always go wrong — if you don&amp;rsquo;t understand the business, the data will trick you forever. Numbers are written by people; they can deceive, and they don&amp;rsquo;t tell everything.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Technical analysis is the disaster zone. If chart patterns really contained a story, some repeatable edge, machine learning would have squeezed it dry decades ago. There&amp;rsquo;d be nothing left for a retail trader drawing lines by eye.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>AI Has No Bubble. AI Stocks Do.</title>
      <link>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/ai-no-bubble/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 31 Oct 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.fengyuwang.com/en/blog/posts/ai-no-bubble/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Everyone is asking: is AI a bubble? The question aims at the wrong target.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;AI cannot be falsified. It genuinely works, and far too many people use it — the productivity gains are real. What can be falsified is profit. The thing people call &amp;ldquo;AI being falsified&amp;rdquo; is the falsification of earnings, not of productivity.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Separate the two and the bubble question resolves itself. Stocks trade on earnings expectations, not on productivity itself. So AI stocks can be in a bubble while AI is not. Bundle them together and the whole thing looks like collective hysteria.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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